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At the end of the twentieth century, buoyed by the successes of the ad hoc tribunals for 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 120 countries voted to adopt the Rome Statute, the treaty to 
establish the International Criminal Court (hereafter the ICC or the Court). Of the seven 
countries that voted against, arguably the most significant was the United States. Indeed, 
when one considers the degree to which the ICC is a logical extension of the rules-based 
order that the United States was so influential in establishing post-World War Two, its 
ongoing lack of membership of the Court remains perplexing. In and of itself, the US’ self-
imposed exile from the ICC would not be important, if not for the fact that the US has 
promoted international law, in particular international law as it relates to international 
criminal justice, as if it were synonymous with American values, while at the same time 
emphasising the superiority of American values over international standards.1  
But how might we explain this reticence towards the Court, especially when one considers 
that the Rome Statute, the Court’s governing treaty, contains many of the legal protections 
afforded under the US legal system?2 This article will argue that the US’ relationship with the 
ICC is part of a longer pattern of US behaviour that can be best explained through the lens of 
exceptionalism. In making this argument, the article has two interrelated objectives: first, to 
provide an historical overview of how the US has behaved vis-à-vis treaty-based international 
legal institutions designed to moderate warfare; and second, to provide a critique of 
arguments that present the United States’ relationship with said legal institutions as nothing 
more than an expression of narrowly informed national interests.  
Considering the often-controversial nature associated with the use of exceptionalism as it 
relates to US foreign policy, it is necessary to offer two important qualifiers. First, it is not 
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Narramore (University of Tasmania), and acknowledge the suggestions and comments from the two anonymous 
reviewers. The research for this article was supported by the George Washington University Law School's 
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1 Michael Ignatieff, ‘Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights’, in M. Ignatieff (ed.), 
American Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p.1. 
2 See The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, available at: 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm (accessed 23rd of July 2013); see also Ruth Wedgewood, ‘The 
Constitution and the ICC’ in Sarah B. Sewell and Carl Kaysen (eds.), The United States and the International 
Criminal Court: National Security and International Law (New York and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2000), p.123. Citing James Madison’s Federalist Papers, Jason Ralph argues that there is nothing more 
American than the ICC (Jason Ralph, ‘The International Criminal Court and the State of the American 
Exception’, in Adam Crawford (ed.), International and Comparative Criminal Justice and Urban Governance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p.79). 
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being argued here that the United States is exceptional; rather, in agreeing with Hilde 
Eliassen Restad, ‘the fact that the belief in exceptionalism has been strong and persistent 
throughout American history’ is most important.3 Second, while I have argued elsewhere that 
the ICC would be strengthened by the US re-signing and subsequently ratifying the Rome 
Statute, it is not the purpose of this article to advocate for the US joining the Court.4 Rather, 
this article aims to situate and explain US conduct within a historical account of America’s 
longstanding ambivalence towards the restraining ideals of laws of war more broadly and the 
ICC more specifically. In this respect, the article hopes to contribute to analysis on how the 
United States interacts with international legal institutions aimed at preventing and/or 
limiting war. To do this, this article identifies key moments in the evolution of international 
laws designed to moderate warfare, and in turn explores the engagement that the United 
States has or had with these treaty-based legal institutions.5  
With this in mind, the article is delivered in two sections. The first explores the concept of 
exceptionalism as it has been applied to the United States, including an argument as to the 
benefits of using it as an explanatory framework. The second section is offered in three parts; 
first, it will trace the history of the United States’ relationship with institutions of 
international law; second, it will provide a history of the United States’ relationship with the 
Court; and finally, drawing on these two sections, conclude by arguing that the invocation 
and disregard of the ICC is reflective of a longer pattern with regards to United States’ 
relationship with institutions of international law and, in turn, argue that this relationship is 
best explained through the lens of exceptionalism. 
Exceptionalism 
The notion of exceptionalism has deep resonance in America. At its most basic level, the 
conception of US exceptionalism rests upon the conviction that the United States is 
qualitatively different and unique from other countries. It is informed by a combination its 
history and experience, first as a settlement away from the rigid feudal structures and 
religious persecution of the Old World, then later through its War of Independence, during 
which Americans manifested the conviction that their nationalist revolt against Great Britain 
was a truly revolutionary episode and that their goal was not only to attain justice for 
                                                            
3 Hilde Eliassen Restad, American Exceptionalism: An idea that made a nation and remade the world (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2015), p.18 (emphasis in original). 
4 See Matt Killingsworth, ‘The International Criminal Court and Global Justice’ in John Adlam, Tilman Kluttig 
and Bandy Lee (eds.), Violent States and Creative States: From the Individual to the Global (London: Jessica 
Kingsley Publishers), pp. 237-250. 
5 To this end, the ICC, as the first treaty based, permanent international criminal court, is the most recent, and 
arguably most important, aspect of the long evolution of laws designed to moderate warfare (see Matt 
Killingsworth, ‘From St Petersburg to Rome: Understanding the Evolution of the Modern Laws of War’, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol.62, No.1, 2016, pp.101-116). Importantly, the Court’s 
jurisdiction also includes the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression (see The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, available at: 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm (accessed 23rd of July 2013). 
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themselves, but also to usher in a new, democratic era in human history.6 Reinforcing notions 
of US exceptionalism is the uniqueness of American political and legal institutions, 
specifically the relationship between the executive, legislature and judiciary. Thus, as Paul 
Kahn notes, American exceptionalism is formed through ‘an intimate relationship among 
American political identity, the rule of law and popular sovereignty’.7   
As a belief, therefore, it is underpinned by three interrelated ideas: first, the United States 
represents a clean break from the Old World; second, that it has a unique and special role to 
play in shaping world history; and third, that unlike great republics of the past, it will be 
eternal.8 In turn, as a belief, it is underpinned by the confidence that the nation's binding 
principles are rooted in qualities and capacities shared by all people, everywhere. Indeed, this 
premise of universalism represents one of the key tensions in the conception of 
exceptionalism when applied to explaining the US’ often inconsistent relationship with 
international law.   
Making the argument for the value in explaining America’s human rights behaviour through 
a lens of exceptionalism, Michael Ignatieff identifies three types of exceptionalism, all of 
which are identifiable with regards to the United States’ historical relationship with laws of 
war. The first type of exceptionalism identified, exemptionalism, is characterised by the US 
signing on to conventions and treaties, then exempting themselves from their provisions ‘by 
explicit reservation, nonratification, or noncompliance’. The second type of exceptionalism is 
characterised by double standards; the US ‘judges itself by standards different from those it 
uses to judge other countries, and judges its friends by standards different from those it uses 
for its enemies’. The third and final type identified is what Ignatieff calls ‘legal isolationism’; 
‘American judges are exceptionally resistant to using foreign human rights precedents to 
guide them in their domestic opinions […] this judicial attitude is anchored in a broad 
popular sentiment that the land of Jefferson and Lincoln has nothing to learn about right from 
any other country’.9 This is the typology adopted here.  
It is tempting to look at the ‘leadership, followed by resistance and retreat’ pattern that 
characterises the United States’ relationship with international law as being merely informed 
by, as Stephen Walt argues, US interests;10 when the treaty or convention equates with or 
serves US interests, they are willing to participate, but when the treaty or convention serves 
to constrain US interests (or even US power), it will no longer feel obligated to behave in the 
manner prescribed by said treaty or convention. For international relations scholars, this 
                                                            
6 Paul T. McCartney, ‘American Nationalism and U.S. Foreign Policy from September 11 to the Iraq War’, 
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 4, (2004), p.402. 
7 Paul W. Kahn, ‘American Exceptionalism, Popular Sovereignty and the Rule of Law’, in Michael Ignatieff 
(ed.), p.200 
8 See Trevor B. McCrisken, ‘Exceptionalism’ in Alexander DeConde, Richard Dean Burns and Fredrik Logevall 
(eds.), Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, Vol II, 2nd ed. (New York: Scribner, 2002), pp.64-65; and 
Restad, p.3.  
9 Ignatieff ,‘Introduction’, pp.3-8. 
10 Stephen M. Walt, ‘The Myth of American Exceptionalism’, Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011; available at 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/the-myth-of-american-exceptionalism/ (accessed 5th of December, 2016) 
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generally represents the realist view of international law. When grudgingly acknowledging its 
existence, realists argue that because international law’s legislative, adjudicative, and 
enforcement procedures operate without a central authority, it has limited effectiveness as a 
mechanism for establishing and maintaining order. Furthermore, only when it serves their 
interests to do so, without ever considering it as binding, powerful states, such as the United 
States, will acknowledge the existence of international law. Thus, for realists, any compliance 
with international law merely reflects a coincidence of interests.11  
But the realist or Realpolitik argument fails to appreciate that the United States has often 
wanted to do more than merely maintain its power at the lowest cost to its sovereignty; for 
Ignatieff, the United States ‘has promoted the very system of multilateral engagements […] 
that abridge and constrain its sovereignty’.12 Similarly, as argued by Natsu Taylor Saito, 
‘Realpolitik arguments disregard the extent to which the United States […] rely upon legal 
structures to further their political ends […] this critique ultimately privileges the rule of 
power over the rule of law by presuming that power cannot be channelled through 
international institutions to enforce, and reinforce, law on a global scale’.13   
A further competing explanation for America’s behaviour vis-à-vis treaty laws designed to 
constrain the behaviour of war is hegemonic international law (HIL). According to Aden 
Warren and Ingvild Bode, HIL has three characteristics: first, ‘the hegemon holds an 
advantaged role in the law creating process’; second, the hegemon is generally ‘disinclined to 
follow the constraints of treaty and customary law on its freedom of action’; and third, ‘the 
hegemon attains de facto or de jure, exceptional rights not available – or available only in 
principle but not in practice – to lesser powers’.14 In explaining the G. W. Bush and Obama 
administration’s attempts to redefine the UN Charter’s jus ad bellum laws concerning the 
restraint on the use of force as being in ‘a fashion consistent with the structure of a de facto 
hegemonic international law’, Warren and Bode make a compelling argument.15 Nonetheless, 
this explanation of the US’ behaviour is historically limited to periods when the US is the 
hegemon. In contrast, the application of an exceptionalism framework reveals historical 
continuities, and thus a more complete understanding, of the US’ relationship vis-à-vis its 
obligations to modern laws of war.  
The United States and the Law of Nations 
                                                            
11 See Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, The Limits of International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005), pp.3-22. 
12 Ignatieff, p.13. 
13 Natsu Taylor Saito, Meeting the Enemy: American Exceptionalism and International Law (New York: New 
York University Press, 2010), p.4.  
14 Aden Warren and Ingvild Bode, Governing the Use-of-Force in International Relations: The Post-9/11 US 
Challenge on International Law (London and New York: Palgrave, 2014), pp.145-149 (emphasis in original). 
See also Jose E. Alvarez, ‘Hegemonic International Law Revisited’, American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 97 (2003), pp.873-888. 
15 Warren and Bode, p.144. 
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American association with international law (or the law of nations as it was commonly 
referred to) goes back to before the Declaration of Independence and the Revolutionary 
War.16 For Mark Janis, the prominence of the law of nations in 18th century American law 
meant that it was unsurprising that it served as an underpinning legal rationale for 
independence from Britain.17 In asserting self-evident and inalienable rights, American 
revolutionaries diverted from international law as it was then understood (as law between 
sovereign nation states) and appealed instead to what Saito calls a ‘higher law’; a natural law 
that recognized freedom, equality, and democracy as inherent rights.18 In this respect, the 
War of Independence was simultaneously justified through reference to international law and, 
in turn, recast international law as it existed. This particularistic interpretation of international 
law, used to defend actions whilst at the same redefining what the law as it existed really 
meant, is one of the earliest expressions of US exceptionalism as it related to international 
law.   
A driving concern for the founders was the establishment of a legal framework for their new 
entity. The reasons for this were many, but key amongst them was the notion that the rule of 
law was crucial in distinguishing the United States as belonging to the civilised, hitherto 
exclusively European, community of nations. This was underpinned by John Jay, the first 
chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, who noted in 1793, before the Constitution had been 
ratified, ‘the United States had, by taking a place among the nations of the earth, become 
amenable to the laws of nations; and it was their interest as well as their duty to provide, that 
those laws should be respected and obeyed’.19  In turn, membership of international society 
was dependent on consistent compliance with the law of nations; Chief Justice John Marshall, 
declared in 1801 that ‘The constitution of the United States declares a treaty to be the 
supreme law of the land. Of consequence, its obligation on the courts of the United States 
must be admitted.’20  
Most importantly to the arguments being made here, it also institutionalised the capacity for 
the federal government to conduct international affairs. Thus, the Constitution not only had 
roots in the law of nations, it also contributed towards the US’ ‘nineteenth century inclination 
towards utopian advocacy of international courts and organisations, culminating in Wilson’s 
League of Nations’.21 
                                                            
16 See Mark W. Janis, America and the Law of Nations 1776-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
pp.1-23; and Saito, pp.35-75. 
17 Janis, pp.25-48. 
18 Saito, p.76.  
19  Cited in David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey and William S. Dodge, ‘International law in the Supreme Court, 
1789–1860’ in D. Sloss, M. Ramsey and W. Dodge (eds.), International Law in the U.S. Supreme Court 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p.7. 
20 Cited in David Haljan, Separating Powers: International Law before National Courts (The Hague: Springer, 
2013), p.160. 
21 Janis, p.37. 
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It is thus clear that there was an equivocal support for international law amongst law makers 
and jurists in the years of the new republic.22 Yet, in what becomes a pattern throughout US 
history, this support came with important qualifiers, the most important of these succinctly 
articulated by Peter Duponceau, a prominent attorney in the late eighteenth century: the rule 
of law, as a product of Western civilisation, ‘can be overridden in the interest of the further 
development or expansion of civilization’.23 In agreeing with Saito, this in turn ‘has 
facilitated U.S. deviations from accepted international law, for when the larger goals of U.S. 
growth have conflicted with law, law has been “trumped” fairly consistently by the benefits 
to civilization said to accrue from such expansion’.24  
The law of nations served multiple purposes for the new republic; observance of the law 
confirmed it as a member of a newly emerging international society, while simultaneously it 
is used politically, ‘…to justify the Revolution, buttress American sovereignty, and structure 
American government […] In the courts, the law of nations shielded American neutrality, 
calmed foreign governments’.25 Returning to our typology, while early interactions with 
international law do not exhibit exemptions, nor are they characterised by legal isolationism, 
the enthusiasm for the law of nations is already clearly characterised by double-standards.26   
The US and the Laws of War  
The period between the middle of the 19th century and the start of the First World War bore 
witness to a flurry of international treaties designed to constrain behaviour during conflict. 
The United States, as an emerging global power, played an important role in the development 
of this new treaty law, most significantly through its participation in the 1899 and 1907 
Hague Peace Conferences. But even here, its involvement provides us with further evidence 
of its participation being underpinned by exceptionalism. With regards to the first Hague 
Convention in 1899, US exemptionalism and double standards were again displayed when 
American involvement was qualified on the proviso that its ongoing war with Spain would 
not be addressed by the conference.27 But, adding to the somewhat contradictory history of 
the US’ engagement with international law, at least with respects to arguments pertaining to 
‘limiting US sovereignty’, the US, along with Britain, were the strongest advocates for a 
                                                            
22 Jordon Paust has demonstrated that the founders and framers stated repeatedly that the Congress, the 
executive branch, the states, the judiciary, and the people themselves were bound both by treaties and customary 
international law (Jordon Paust, ‘In Their Own Words: Affirmations of the Founders, Framers, and Early 
Judiciary concerning the Binding Nature of the Customary Law of Nations’, Journal of International Law and 
Policy 14 (2008), p.212. 
23 Cited in Paust, p.212. 
24 Saito, p.85. 
25 Janis, p.143. 
26 Expansion westward, informed by the idea of ‘manifest destiny’, and the Mexican – American War, also 
serve as apt 19th century examples of the tension between US enthusiasm for international law, and a failure to 
observe its restraining influences when advancing civilisation (see Frederick Merk, Destiny and Mission in 
American History: A Reinterpretation (Cambridge, Mass., Cambridge University Press, 1963), p.25. 
27 Saito, p.168. 
 7 
 
permanent and universal court of arbitration.28 While a somewhat modified permanent, 
temporary court of arbitration was adopted at the subsequent 1907 Hague Conference, US 
representatives continued to push for the establishment of a permanent court; they were 
successful in developing the Draft Convention Relative to the Institution of a Court of 
Arbitral Justice, the forerunner to first the Permanent Court of International Justice, and later 
the International Court of Justice.29  
The US also played a significant role at the Hauge Conference with respect to codifying the 
laws of war through what was essentially an adoption of the already existing Lieber Code.30 
As it relates to explaining the US’ relationship vis-a-vis international law, this is significant 
for several reasons: first, we find here one of the earliest examples of US domestic law 
directly influencing the creation of international law; second, as Saito identifies, the leading 
role assumed by the United States in the development of Hague laws of war acknowledged 
‘the existence of an underlying body of customary international law’;31 and third, the Hague 
Conferences, as identified by Chris Reus-Smit, were a step in the realisation of a civilised 
polity ‘and thus a desirable feature of a society of civilised states’;32 US participation thus 
served to reinforce their membership, indeed emerging leadership, of a civilised, international 
society. Similarly, as identified by Calvin DeArmond Davis, it continued ‘the American 
tradition of supporting movements to maintain peace through judicial methods’.33 
Nonetheless, American interaction with the broader international community remained 
‘bellicose, imperialistic and selfishly isolationist’.34  
Returning again to our typology, there remained a duality with respect to American actions; 
while good intentioned, in that they informed by broader concern for peace and justice, the 
US’ actions are nonetheless characterised by exemptionalism, whereby the enthusiasm for 
institutions of international law are subsequently subdued via attempts to exclude themselves 
from the treaty’s provisions.    
The US and Twentieth Century Laws of War 
By the mid-twentieth century, the United States had become, according to Richard Falk, ‘the 
principle source of order in the world, both as a great power and as an advocate for the 
                                                            
28 Janis, The American Tradition of International Law: Great Expectations 1798-1914 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2004), p.148 
29 Francis Anthony Boyle, Foundations of World Order: The Legalist Approach to International Relations 
(1898–1922), (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999), pp.42-43. See also C. DeArmond Davis, The 
United States and the First Hague Peace Conference (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962). 
30 See ‘Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code). 24 April 
1863’, available at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/110 (accessed 28th of August, 2018).  
31 Saito, p.170. 
32 Christian Rues-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity and Institutional Rationality in 
International Relations (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1999), p.142. 
33 DeArmond Davis, p.211. 
34 DeArmond Davis, p.211. 
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increased respect of juridical arrangements’.35 It is in this context that the United States 
played a leading role in the establishment of post-war institutions designed to constrain the 
use of force.  
Understandably, US enthusiasm for international law as a utopian peace mechanism was 
dampened by the events of the first half of the twentieth century.36 Nonetheless, a degree of 
lingering utopianism was evident in Woodrow Wilson’s post-World War One efforts to 
establish the League of Nations, underpinned as it was by Wilson’s belief that its 
establishment would ensure ‘political independence and territorial integrity to great and small 
states alike’.37 Indeed, the establishment of the League ‘marked a significant transition from 
an international legal system in which individual states were the only recognized subjects, or 
actors, to one in which those states had come together to create a supranational actor’.38  
As is well documented, despite the League being the product of American diplomatic efforts, 
the US failed to join. Concerned in particular with Article of 10 of the League’s Covenant, 
which committed member states to protecting all other members from external acts of 
aggression against their political independence or territorial integrity, prominent members of 
the US Senate argued that it impinged on US sovereignty and indeed encouraged 
belligerence, and thus failed to ratify both the Covenant and the Treaty of Versailles.39  
The dominant narrative of the US during the inter-war years is one of isolationism, yet ‘the 
US government continued to pursue a foreign policy based on the active promotion of 
international law and organisations for the rest of the world’.40 Therefore, the US is 
simultaneously driving and promoting an increasingly dense regime of international law 
designed to constrain war, all the while either exempting themselves through non-ratification 
(as was the case with the League of Nations) or non-compliance (as is the case with the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact).41 Thus, US efforts to reconcile their ideological support for 
institutionalised laws of war increasingly informed by humanitarian concerns with their own 
expanding national interests is, as argued throughout this article, best explained through the 
lens of exceptionalism.  
The creation of the United Nations (UN) represents arguably the starkest expression of US 
exceptionalism. Seeking to ensure that Wilson’s post-World War One mistakes were not 
repeated, President Roosevelt ensured Congress was consulted and included in the pre-San 
                                                            
35 Richard Falk, The Declining World Order: America’s Imperial Geopolitics (New York: Routledge, 2004), 
p.111 
36 See Janis, The American Tradition of International Law, p.134. 
37 Woodrow Wilson, ‘President Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points (1918)’, available at 
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=62 (accessed 8th of December, 2016). 
38 Saito, p.172 
39 Boyle, p.138 
40 Boyle, p.144. Perhaps the best example of this was the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, in which the United States 
and sixteen other signatories agreed to renounce war as an act of foreign policy and to settle disputes peacefully. 
41 See Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic 
Books, 2002), pp.129-204 and 231-252. 
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Francisco negotiations and agreed to host the conference in the United States and provide a 
location for the UN headquarters, all which went a long way to ensure that the organisation 
would be imbued with American values and goals.42 The creation of the UN had a substantive 
effect on the underpinnings of international law. As discussed above, for much of the modern 
period, international law, with several notable exceptions, was essentially considered as the 
practise of civilised states. Under the auspices of UN, new laws, and much of the pre-existing 
international law became codified, and a reinvigorated world court, the International Court of 
Justice, was established with jurisdiction to resolve legal disputes.  
The post-war environment, described by Louis Henkin as an ‘age of rights’,43 was also 
understandably sympathetic to the establishment of new legal mechanisms, the aims of which 
would be the ‘punishment, through the channel of organised justice, of those guilty of or 
responsible for these [war] crimes’.44 With this in mind, the United States, led by Supreme 
Court Justice Robert Jackson, first designed the plan for the prosecution of Axis leaders, then 
pressured the Allied nations to create the Charter of International Military Tribunal, the treaty 
authorising the Nuremburg Tribunal.  
The significance of the Nuremberg Tribunal in expanding the responsibility under 
international law for war crimes from the state to individuals is well documented, as is the 
dominant role that the United States played in this expansion and redefinition of international 
law, and thus the new international legal order.45 Somewhat similarly, the United States was 
an enthusiastic participant at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference of Geneva, which subsequently 
established the four Geneva Conventions (these, plus the three 1977 Additional Protocols, 
form the bedrock of the international humanitarian law (IHL) regime). With minor 
reservations, the Senate ratified the Conventions 77-0 in 1951 after minimal debate.46 
Commenting on their ratification, R. R. Baxter opined: ‘It is to be hoped that the ratification 
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 […] may inspire further ratifications and accessions so 
that the conventions may assume their rightful place as universal humanitarian law’.47 Again, 
                                                            
42 Stephen Schlesinger, Art of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations (Boulder: Westview, 2004), p.111-
126 
43 Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). 
44 Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremburg Trials: A Personal Memoir ((New York: Knopf, 1992), p.25 
45 The US’ own understanding of their role in this expansion and the indeed the increased importance of law in 
maintaining international order is neatly summarised by Justice Jackson, when he noted that the United States 
‘was not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing to have 
invoked against us’ (cited in Taylor, p.66). 
46 See R. R. Baxter, ‘The Geneva Conventions of 1949 Before the United States Senate’, The American Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Oct.,1955), pp.550-555. 
47 Baxter, p.555. Two points of note: first, somewhat controversially, the United States, while signatories to both 
1977 Additional Protocols 1 and 2 of the Geneva Conventions, have not ratified them; and second, while outside 
the scope of this article, the United States’ rejection of aspects of the Geneva Conventions with regards to both 
the broader War on Terror and the torture of inmates at Guantanamo Bay is yet another example of double-
standards. See, for example: Jens David Ohlin, The assault on international law (New York, NY : Oxford 
University Press, 2015); Gilles Andreani, ‘The “War on Terror”: Good Cause, Wrong Concept’, Survival, vol. 
46, no. 4, 2004; Andrew Hurrell, ‘“There are No Rules” (George W. Bush): International Order after September 
11’, International Relations, vol. 16, no. 2, 2002., pp.185-204; and Harold Hongju Koh, ‘America’s Jekyll – and 
– Hyde Exceptionalism’ in M. Ignatieff (ed.), pp.111-143. 
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for Baxter and his ilk, the post-World War Two environment offered an opportunity for the 
United States to expand the scope of international law, with a focus on legal restraints with 
respect to the use of force, as a foundation of the post-war order, which in turn was modelled 
on US values.  
This was again evident in the immediate post-Cold War environment, when, according to 
Henry Kissinger, ‘for the third time in this century, America thus proclaimed its intention to 
build a new world order by applying its domestic values to the world at large’.48 The first 
example of G. H. W. Bush’s ‘new world order’ was the US-led, UN sanctioned response to 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. A later example, and one of particular relevance to this article, was 
the key role that the United States played in the establishment of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and, to a lesser extent, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).  
In 1992, the second year of the Yugoslav conflict, various humanitarian groups, including the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), had documented violations of IHL. By the 
end of that year, in response to these reports, ‘U.S. policy makers were becoming 
increasingly vocal’ about the need for a mechanism through which to prosecute the most 
serious violations.49 Indeed, according to William Schabas, ‘the most enthusiastic – and 
ultimately decisive – support for the idea of the tribunal [came] from the United States’.50 
Similarly, the United States was able to convince the post-genocide Rwandan government of 
the need for an international tribunal. Likewise, it was at the behest of the United States that 
the two tribunals originally shared a prosecutor and appeals chamber.51 
Hoverer, problems arose for the United States vis-à-vis the ICTY following the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo in 1999. As NATO’s forces were involved in an armed conflict on the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia, they fell within the tribunal’s jurisdiction. This 
increasingly became an issue as reports emerged of NATO airstrikes killing civilians, most 
notoriously when they partly destroyed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. When the 
prosecutor, Louise Arbour, broached the subject of the bombing with then US Secretary of 
State, Madeleine Albright, she responded; ‘I won’t get into an argument of moral 
equivalence’.52 Later, when the new prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, sent NATO a list of detailed 
questions regarding targeting policy, none of her queries were answered. In her biography, 
del Ponte writes: 
                                                            
48 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p.805. 
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51 See Schabas, pp.27-28. 
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I quickly concluded that it was impossible to investigate NATO because NATO and 
its member states would not cooperate with us. […] Over and above this, however, I 
understood that I collided with the edge of the political universe in which the tribunal 
was allowed to function. If I went forward with an investigation of NATO […] I 
would render my office incapable of continuing to investigate and prosecute the 
crimes committed by the local forces during the wars of the 1990s.53 
Returning to our exceptionalism typology, del Ponte description provides a stark example of 
double standards, with the US ‘judging itself by different standards from those it uses to 
judge other countries’. Again, we find evidence of the theme identified here as being present 
throughout the history of the United States’ engagements with international law designed to 
constrain the use of force: the US, keen to both expand and redefine the limits of international 
law as a foundation of a civilised global order, while simultaneously unwilling to be 
constrained by its obligations.   
The US and the International Criminal Court 
Despite it initially being supportive of the creation of a permanent international criminal 
court, it is well known that the United States was one of seven countries to vote against 
adopting the Rome Statute as the founding document for the ICC.54 Nonetheless, President 
Clinton signed the Rome Statute, making a point that the United States was reaffirming its 
‘strong support for international accountability and for bringing to justice perpetrators of 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity’. But, in an important qualifier, Clinton 
argued that the Statute contained ‘significant flaws’, and recommended that his successor 
‘not submit the Treaty to the Senate for advice and consent until our fundamental concerns 
are satisfied’.55  
Post-Rome, US officials adopted a slightly revised opposition to the Court; while continuing 
to focus on the objectionable aspects of the Statute that they argued made it impossible for 
the US to join the Court, they also argued that a Court without US involvement would 
quickly become marginalised. In an argument that was wholly underpinned by US self-
perceptions as a great power, David Scheffer argued that ‘without the United States, the 
effectiveness of the permanent international criminal court will fall far short of its 
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Impunity: A Memoir (New York: Other Press, 2009), p.60 
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55 William Clinton, ‘Statement on the Signature of the International Criminal Court Treaty’, Washington DC, 
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potential’.56 Nonetheless, between 1998 and 2001, the US maintained a cordial relationship 
with the nascent Court, including proactive participation at the post-Rome Preparatory 
Committee (PrepComm).57 
Bush and the ICC 
The outward hostility expressed towards the Court by the G. W. Bush administration is well 
documented. Nonetheless, it remains worthwhile revisiting the way in which the first Bush 
administration (2000 – 2004) aggressively sought to undermine the Court. Its first act was to 
‘unsign’ the Rome Statute, with Under Secretary of State John Bolton informing the UN that 
the US now had ‘no legal obligations arising from its signature on 31st December, 2000’. In 
coordinated messages, Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, railing against 
Article 12 of the Rome Statute, argued that ‘while sovereign nations have the authority to try 
non-citizens who have committed crimes against their citizens or on their territory, the United 
States has never recognised the right of an international organisation to do so absent consent 
or a UN Security Council mandate’.58 Echoing common conservative objections to the Court, 
Grossman argued that the US’ opposition to the Court was premised primarily on the belief 
that it undermined the central role of the UN Security Council in maintaining international 
peace and security and that in creating a prosecutorial system that is ‘an unchecked power’, 
the Rome Statute was undemocratic.   
The Bush administration had the same two concerns that Clinton’s negotiating team had 
expressed in 1998: first, the jurisdiction of the Court; and second, the limited role proposed 
for the United Nations Security Council in the Court’s affairs. With regards to the jurisdiction 
of the Court, the US delegation took umbrage to Article 12 of the Rome Statute. While they 
were content for the Court to have jurisdiction over nationals of state parties, the proposal 
(eventually adopted in the Rome Statute) that the Court be able to exercise jurisdiction over 
nationals of non-states parties, provided the alleged crime took place on the territory of a state 
party to the Statute, was non-negotiable. Arguing that such a proposal violated the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states that a treaty is not legally binding on non-
signatories, Scheffer, the head of the US negotiating team in Rome, referred to the provisions 
of Article 12 as ‘the single most fundamental flaw in the Rome Treaty that makes it 
impossible for the United States to sign’.59 Echoing these concerns, Madeline Morris argued 
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that no such precedent for universal jurisdiction existed in international law and thus the 
Statute far exceeded the fundamental principles of international law.60 
The second concern voiced by the US related to the eventual diminished role of the United 
Nations Security Council vis-à-vis the Court. The US was supportive of the original 
International Law Commission draft proposal for an international criminal court, which 
effectively subordinated the court to the United Nations Security Council. 61 However, 
delegates at the Rome Conference, led by the so-called like-minded group, rejected this 
proposal. Despite intense US lobbying, the final version of the Rome Statute provides a much 
more diminished role for the Security Council than that advocated for by the US.62 
The administration’s opposition to the ICC was reinforced through legislation that not only 
echoed the Executive’s objections to the Court, but also chastened countries who supported 
the ICC. The American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA), signed into law by 
President Bush in August 2002, prohibited almost all US support for and cooperation with the 
ICC and, most controversially, allowed the US President to use ‘all means necessary and 
appropriate’ to free Americans ‘being detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the 
request of the International Criminal Court’ (hence often being referred to as The Hague 
Invasion Act).63 Simultaneously, the US undertook an aggressive campaign of bilateral 
immunity agreements (BIAs) which committed signatories to the Rome Statute not to turn 
over American citizens to the Court. In a number of cases, the US linked the provision of 
military aid on the condition of signing a BIA.64 
Finally, the US used its position on the Security Council to further undermine the universal 
jurisdiction aims of the Court, demanding a blanket immunity from ICC jurisdiction for all 
UN peacekeepers be a condition of its continued support for the UN Mission in Bosnia. A 
compromise was eventually reached; UNSC Resolution 1422 granted US peacekeepers 
blanket immunity for one year, with the possibility of annual renewal.65 
The vociferous objections to the Court were thus underpinned by two broad, interrelated 
concerns: first, that the Rome Statute, in undermining the historically central role of the 
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Security Council to maintain ‘international peace and security’ simultaneously failed to 
acknowledge the ‘great power’ status of the United States; and second, in asserting 
jurisdiction over citizens of non state parties and un-ratified parties to the Statute, the very 
existence of the ICC threatened US sovereignty.  
Before exploring possible explanations for the US’ behaviour, it is worth noting that these 
objections remain informed by fundamental misunderstandings about the Rome Statute. First, 
and most importantly, the Statute is underpinned by the principle of complementarity. As 
Jason Ralph points out, the US Congress has passed both the War Crimes Act (1996) and the 
Genocide Convention Implementation Act (1997), meaning that under the complementarity 
principle, the ICC would most likely be satisfied that the United States could be solely 
responsible for prosecuting violations by US citizens of the core crimes outlined in the Rome 
Statute.66 Second, the US’ initial obligation that the Statute violated the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties was misleading, as the Rome Statute does not impose any obligations 
on non-parties. Thus, the Court has very little practical impact on US legal sovereignty.  
Despite President Bush campaigning on his continued opposition to the Court,67 in its first 
three years of operation, most of the American fears regarding the Court failed to eventuate; 
it had shown no interest in pursuing cases that might implicate the United States; nor had the 
prosecutor relied on his own power to initiate investigations. It was in this environment that 
the United States felt they could engage with the Court on the atrocities that were occurring 
in Darfur, Sudan. 
Indeed, the UN Security Council referral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC represented a 
turning point in the US relationship with the Court. Lobbied by first France, and then Britain, 
who tied the US’ support for peacekeeping operations to support north-south peace 
negotiations, US support for a Security Council referral also came from an unlikely source. 
Jack Goldsmith, writing in a Washington Post op-ed, argued that:  
The Darfur case allows the United States to argue that Security Council referrals are 
the only valid route to ICC prosecutions and that countries that are not parties to the 
ICC (such as the United States) remain immune from ICC control in the absence of 
such a referral. This course of action would signal U.S. support not only for the 
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United Nations but for international human rights as well, at a time when Washington 
is perceived by some as opposing both.68 
Nonetheless, cooperation came with important qualifications. According to Condoleezza 
Rice, when speaking to British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw: ‘I said it depends on what 
‘assist’ means. Would we share information and intelligence? Will we go pick [indictees] up 
and deliver [them] to the Court? No. Will we help facilitate what the Court wants to carry 
out? Yes, we would do that’.69 Importantly, the support for the referral came with the caveat 
that it should not be misinterpreted as US support to re-sign the Rome Statute.70  
Events later that year further reinforced the United States’ double standards with respect to 
the Court. The Iraq War remained the metaphorical elephant in the room with respects to 
holding US service personal responsible for alleged war crimes. Thus, when in 2005, the 
Iraqi Human Rights Minister announced his intention to sign the Rome Statute, an act that 
would have meant the actions of US defence force personnel could come under the 
jurisdiction of the Court, American pressure very quickly ensured that this did not happen.71 
The first Bush administration’s aggressive attitude towards the Court was underpinned by 
what Bosco calls ‘traditional American sovereignty concerns and scepticism of international 
institutions that was particularly strong in conservative circles’.72 Similarly, Andrea Birdsall 
points out that the United States ‘maintained that it opposed the ICC because it had the 
potential to limit state sovereignty by enforcing universal values through an international 
institution that was unaccountable to the UN and also to the United States’.73 There is thus a 
temptation, as explored earlier, to interpret American actions vis-à-vis the Court as the 
realisation of either a realist foreign policy, or HIL. But the limitations outlined above still 
render these explanations unsatisfactory. Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that the 
Bush administration’s interactions with the Court, differed in important ways to the earlier 
interactions with treaty-based institutions explored in this article. In particular, the aggressive 
and belligerent tone of public statements and legislative language representative a type of 
‘hyper-exceptionalism’, where the US not only refused to be held by the same standards by 
which it judged other countries, or that it maintained the belief that Americans service 
personnel should be held accountable in American courts, but that the United States remained 
hostilely intransigent to the widely held understanding that despite ‘un-signing’ the Rome 
Statute, the Court could still have jurisdiction over American nationals on the territory of 
states party to the Statute.   
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Obama and the ICC 
The election of Barack Obama in 2008 was greeted with optimism by Court officials in The 
Hague. While the Court had not featured as part of the presidential campaign, there was an 
expectation that the new administration would be much friendlier to the Court, confirmed 
when Obama employed individuals supportive of the Court to key administrative positions.74 
Nonetheless, despite the optimism, the Obama administration’s relationship with the Court, 
while certainly not as outwardly hostile as the first Bush administration, remained 
characterised by qualified engagement.  
In language similar to that used in the latter years of the Bush administration, the May, 2010 
National Security Strategy summarised the US’ relationship with the Court in the following 
manner:  
Although the United States is not at present a party to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, and will always protect U.S. personnel, we are engaging 
with State Parties to the Rome Statute on issues of concern and are supporting the 
ICC’s prosecution of those cases that advance U.S. interests and values, consistent 
with the requirements of U.S. law. Although the United States is not a party to the 
ICC’s Statute, the Obama administration has been prepared to support the court’s 
prosecutions and provide assistance in response to specific requests from the I.C.C. 
prosecutor and other court officials, consistent with U.S. law, when it is in U.S. 
national interest to do so.75 
There were, however, obvious differences between the two administration’s engagement 
strategies. For example, in 2009, for the first time since 2001, the United States participated 
as an observer at the Assembly of State Parties (ASP) meeting and in 2010, the U.S. 
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, Stephen Rapp, announced that the US would 
assist the ICC to protect witnesses who testify before the Court in its proceedings on Kenya.76 
In 2011, having co-sponsored Security Council Resolution 1970, US Ambassador to the UN, 
Susan Rice, commented: ‘We are pleased to have supported this entire resolution and all of 
its measures including the referral to the ICC’.77 Arguably the most significant moment with 
regards to the US’ relationship with the ICC occurred in March, 2013, when indicted 
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Congolese warlord Bosco Ntaganda turned himself in at the US embassy in Rwanda, 
requesting to be transferred to The Hague.78 In the same month, Rapp announced an 
expansion of the Rewards for Justice program, offering up to five million dollars for 
information that might lead to the arrest, transfer, and conviction of those wanted for arrest 
by the ICC, leading David Kaye to conclude that although the United States was no closer to 
re-signing the Rome Statute, it was ‘arguably doing as much as, if not more than, member 
states are doing to bolster the work of the court’.79 And finally, in its last meaningful 
interaction with the Court, the Obama administration issued support for France’s proposed 
Security Council Resolution authorising the ICC to investigate alleged crimes in Syria.80 
There remained a duality to this engagement, however. Case in point is the 2014 memo 
issued by the Obama administration certifying ‘that members of the U.S. Armed Forces 
participating in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali 
are without risk of criminal prosecution or other assertion of jurisdiction by the International 
Criminal Court (ICC)’.81 Similarly, the support for France’s push for the ICC to investigate 
alleged crimes in Syria was only proffered after the US was assured that the prosecutor 
‘would have no authority to investigate any possible war crimes by Israel’.82  
Congress also renewed its antipathy towards the Court. In 2014, the House of Representatives 
passed legislation making financial assistance for the Palestinian Authority unavailable if ‘the 
Palestinians initiate an International Criminal Court judicially authorized investigation, or 
actively support such an investigation, that subjects Israeli nationals to an investigation for 
alleged crimes against Palestinians’.83 In 2015, a seven-member delegation of senators 
visiting Israel, Saudi Arabia and Qatar described Palestine’s decision to join the Court as 
‘deplorable’ and ‘counterproductive’, with Lindsey Graham affirming that the US would ‘cut 
off aid to the Palestinians if they filed a complaint’ against Israel.84 
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Thus, while the Obama administration’s dealings with the Court were not as openly hostile as 
they were in the early years of the Bush administration, it nonetheless had what Mark Kersten 
has described as little more ‘than a selective love for the ICC’.85 In this respect, adopting a 
‘long-history’ view of the US’ relationship with international legal institutions concerned 
with moderating the use of force, the Obama administration’s relationship with the Court 
follows the pattern identified in this article; enthusiastic engagement underpinned by broad 
conceptions of humanitarianism as it relates to justice, and leadership of a civilised society of 
states, juxtaposed against resistance to constraints imposed by the legal institution, most often 
expressed via the language of US national interests. Returning to the exceptionalism typology 
identified above, the Obama administration’s activities vis-à-vis the ICC are characterised by 
double-standards; the US was willing to support the Court’s activities as a mechanism of 
realising justice, except where US defence force personnel, or defence force personnel of US 
allies, as was the case with Israel, came under the purview of the Court.  
Trump and the ICC 
Without ever engaging directly on the topic of the ICC, it was assumed that Donald Trump’s 
‘American First’ mantra, and thus general animosity towards multilateral institutions 
exhibited during the campaign and his presidency, would also extend to the Court. This was 
confirmed in early September, 2018, when Bolton, now in his capacity as Trump’s National 
Security Advisor, and prompted by concerns that the Pre-Trial Chamber might be about to 
authorise opening a situation in Afghanistan that would include investigating CIA operatives 
allegedly torturing suspected Taliban operatives in ‘black sites’ in Lithuania, Poland and 
Romania,86 announced that ‘the United States will use any means necessary to protect our 
citizens and those of our allies from unjust prosecution by this illegitimate court. We will not 
cooperate with the ICC. We will provide no assistance to the ICC. We will not join the ICC. 
We will let the ICC die on its own’.87 Bolton also announced that ‘if the court comes after us, 
Israel or other US allies, we will not sit quietly […] We will ban [ICC] judges and 
prosecutors from entering the United States. We will sanction their funds in the US financial 
system, and we will prosecute them in the US criminal system’.88 Finally, echoing previously 
stated objections to the ICC, Bolton argued that ‘this president will not allow American 
citizens to be prosecuted by foreign bureaucrats, and he will not allow other nations to dictate 
our means of self-defence’.89  
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While it would be premature to draw conclusions about how the Trump administration’s 
threats might play out, Bolton’s pronouncements are not dissimilar to those he made 
previously about the Court. Therefore, and again being careful to acknowledge that the 
Trump administration’s relationship with the Court will most probably shift from hostility to 
outright belligerence if the ICC chooses to investigate American citizens, the most recent 
activities vis-à-vis the Court are an extension of the US’ exceptionalist attitude towards 
international law; specifically in this case, the belief that it is reasonable to exempt itself from 
obligations to which it holds others because it has a higher or more evolved domestic legal 
and political system which provides adequate, even superior, protection of rights.90 
Conclusion  
Writing in 2005, Anne-Marie Slaughter argued that the rise of transnational networks 
anchored by multilateral institutions such as the UN, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
and the European Union (EU), meant that law was no longer solely bound by the ‘national’. 
As such, the United States could no longer remain disengaged from the increasing 
‘internationalisation’ of law related to human rights and humanitarianism. For Slaughter, this 
meant that the United States would have increasing incentives to become less exceptional and 
to align its laws more closely with those of other states and international law.91 
Slaughter’s prediction was representative of a broader optimism for the spread and increased 
effectiveness of international law at the time. Yet while she was correct with her observation 
about the increasing reach of law beyond the national, this has certainly not resulted in the 
US becoming less exceptional with regards to international law. Indeed, as demonstrated 
throughout this article, the US’ relationship with contemporary international law, and the 
laws of war in particular, has been remarkably consistent.  
Competing explanations for this consistent behaviour include realism, with its simultaneous 
focus on the rational behaviour of self-interested states and the resultant limited efficacy of 
international law; and hegemonic international law (HIL), which, somewhat similarly to the 
exceptionalism framework adopted here, identifies hegemonic interactions with the 
development and implementation of international law that best suits the interests of hegemon 
(in this case, the United States). But both these alternative explanations have limited 
explanatory value. The reduction of state behaviour as informed by narrow interests is not 
only overly simplistic, it fails to adequately appreciate the degree to which US action is 
informed by the formative experience of ‘creating’ the United States. As argued throughout 
this article, not only has the US engaged with treaty-based legal institutions when there are no 
obvious interests at stake, but that engagement has been underpinned by broader conceptions 
of international law as an ordering principle in a society of civilised states. Further, while the 
reluctance of the US to be bound by international laws that it in turn demands others obey 
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might be viewed as hypocritical, there is a logic to the US’ behaviour, informed by domestic 
experience, that provides a less cynical explanation:  
International law as a useful tool for creating order and securing rights abroad is 
hardly inconsistent with a self-understanding that sees little need for international law 
to limit and define its own politics of self-government. The United States will 
instinctively avoid application of that law to its own political order. To the rest of the 
world, this is bound to look hypocritical. In the United States, it will look like an 
insistence on democratic self-government.92 
Ahistorical accounts of US interaction with treaty-based international law are also limited. As 
revealed here, an exploration of the US’ history in engaging with treaty-based international 
laws of war, highlights a consistent pattern of behaviour: well intentioned, often enthusiastic 
support and leadership for international laws premised on the creation and maintenance of a 
civilised society of states, followed by ‘resistance and retreat’ when the law was seen to 
conflict with US national interests. Explanations with limited historical scope, such as HIL, 
while still useful, provide only a small view of a much larger perspective.   
The aim of this article was not to pass judgement on the US’ attitude towards international 
law. Rather, it was to argue that the pattern of exemptionalism, double standards and legal 
isolationism that was identified throughout the history of the US’ interactions with treaty law 
designed to moderate warfare, is best explained through the application of exceptionalism.  
The application of an exceptionalist framework that is informed by the US’ formative 
domestic experience serves to provide the most complete explanation of the US’ historical 
relationship with treaty-based laws of war. Furthermore, it might also serve to provide a 
reconciliatory explanation of the US achieving political ends through international legal 
institutions. The exceptionalism framework adopted here overcomes ahistorical accounts of 
the US’ often fraught relationship with first, the law of nations, then multilateral treaty-based 
laws of war, and most recently, newly developed multilateral legal mechanisms designed to 
punish violations of the laws of war (namely the ICC). Explaining this relationship through 
the lens of exceptionalism also provides a more nuanced comprehension of US actions than 
frameworks informed and underpinned by narrow conceptions of the national interest, which, 
as noted above, often fail to adequately acknowledge the degree to which US national 
interests can be achieved through multilateral engagement.  
                                                            
92 Kahn, p.221. 
